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ABSTRACT 
After a traffic accident the damage has to be fairly divided 
among the parties involved, and a ratio has to be determined. 
There are many precedents for this, and judges have developed cat-
alogues suggesting ratios for common types of accidents. 
The problem that "every case is different," however, remains. 
Many cases have familiar aspects, but also unfamiliar ones. Even if 
a case is composed of several familiar aspects with established ra-
tios, the question remains as to how these are to be figured into one 
ratio. The first thought would be to invent a mathematical 
formula, but such formulae are rigid and speculative. The body of 
law has grown organically and must not be forced into a sleek sys-
tem. The distant consequences of using a mathematical formula 
cannot be foreseen; they might well be grossly unjust. 
I suggest using a neural network instead. Precedents may be 
fed into the network directly as learning patterns. This has the 
advantage that court rulings can be transferred directly and not via 
a formula. Future modifications in court rulings also can be 
adopted by the network. As far as the effect of the learning pat-
terns on new cases is concerned, a relatively safe assumption is that 
they will fit in harmoniously with the precedents. This is due to 
the network's structure—a number of simple decisional units, 
which are interconnected, tune their activity to each other, thus 
achieving a state of equilibrium. When the conditions of such an 
equilibrium are translated back into the terms of the case, the solu-
tion can hardly be totally unjust. 
INTRODUCTION 
A . 
I would like to begin my discussion on the distribution of dam-
ages in car accidents by refering to a legal case of inheritance from 
ancient Rome. This is not a far-fetched comparison; their children's 
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inheritance was as important to the Romans as the state of our cars is 
to us Germans. Consequently, problems of distribution are similar. 
In The Digest of Justinian , 1 the following case is reported: a hus­
band, mortally ill and with a pregnant wife, writes his will: 
si filius mihi natus fuerit, ex besse heres esto: ex reliqua parte uxor 
mea heres esto. si uero (ilia mihi nata fuerit, ex triente heres esto: 
ex reliqua parte uxor heres esto. . . . 
[I]f a son is born to me let him be heir in respect of two thirds, let 
my wife be heir in respect of the remaining part; but if a daughter 
is born to me, let her be heir to the extent of a third; let my wife be 
heir in respect of the remaining part.2 
Then the man dies. But the wife gives birth to twins: a boy and a 
girl. 3 
It was clear to the Romans that the solution to this case could 
not be drawn directly from the will. It is the testament's clear as­
sumption that only one child would be born; the testator did not pro­
vide for the case of twins. A small-minded administration of the law 
would consider the will void: "suptili iuris regulae conueniebat rup-
tum fieri testamentum."4 The following interpretation would be more 
humane—"humanitate suggerente decursum est"5—and is in accord­
ance with the testator's presumed wishes.6 It also met, according to 
Julian, the approval of Juventius Celsus (who apparently originally 
recorded the case): 
dicendum est assem distribuendum esse in septem partes, ut ex his 
filius quattuor, uxor duas, filia unam partem habeat: ita enim 
secundum uoluntatem testantis filius altero tanto amplius habebit 
quam uxor, item uxor altero tanto amplius quam filia. 
[T]he decision must be that the whole inheritance should be di­
vided into seven parts, so that the son gets four of them, the wife 
two, and the daughter one; for in this way, in accordance with the 
wishes of the testator, the son will have as much more again as the 
wife and the wife as much more again as the daughter.7 
At first glance this is an impressive solution, but less so when one 
looks again. With all due respect to the Roman jurists, I cannot ap­
prove of the decision. One-seventh of the inheritance is too little for 
1 DIG. 28.2.13 (Julian, Digest 29), reprinted in 2 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 821 (T . 
Mommsen, P. Krucger & A. Watson trans. 198S). 
2 Id 
3 Id 
« Id 
* Id 
6 Id 
ι Id 
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the daughter. The difference between the daughter's portion and the 
son's portion is too great; the proportion of 1:4 is inadequate. 
I am not even arguing from the point of view of our modern 
values, but this is also true with regard to the testator's presumed will. 
One can understand the testator's presumed will through a little 
mental experiment: if we assume that the husband had considered the 
case that his wife might die after giving birth, and that the property 
would have to be divided among a daughter and a son, would he not 
again have ordered a ratio of 1:2? From the testament one can 
surmise that a male should receive twice as much as a female. 
Of course one can also take from the will the statement that the 
mother should receive twice as much as the daughter. But if one 
compares the different statements, there is an open contradiction in 
the case of three heirs—if the son can expect twice as much as the 
mother, and also twice as much as the daughter, then the mother 
must expect the same amount as the daughter and not twice as much. 
Such a contradiction is by no means unusual. Whenever a just 
division is called for, and there are different statements as to how to 
divide, such conflicts can arise. This we know at least since Chaim 
Perelman's investigations of the "antinomies of justice."8 In fact, the 
problem of division remains if we alter the case and suppose the hus-
band had known that his wife was bearing twins. He would have faced 
the same problem—how to unite his concepts that a male should re-
ceive twice as much as a female and a mother twice as much as a 
daughter. But the knowing testator retains the freedom of the legisla-
tor (e.g., the freedom not to tackle the problem). That this freedom is 
taken away from him in our case is a trick to pinpoint the problem. 
What appears to be a peripheral legal problem is in fact an arti-
fice to cast light on a general and fundamental problem. Celsus might 
have invented the case or come across it and recognized its impor-
tance. Either way, it is a stroke of genius. 
B. 
What is to be done in such contradictory cases? Most impor-
tantly, the individual postulates must be defined. This provides com-
mon ground for the argument. In some cases it will be possible to 
unify the contradicting postulates; to find a compromise. 
Perhaps modern technology can be of assistance here: envision a 
machine which strives for equilibrium. Into this machine the case's 
controversial postulates are fed, creating a model of the conflict inside 
* C. PERELMAN, D E LA JUSTICE (BruxeHes 1945) (source on file with author). 
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the machine. When the strain inside this model has been resolved 
into a state of equilibrium, the solution is transferred back into the 
terms of the case. 
It is not difficult to imagine a machine that strives for equi­
librium. Yet, such a machine exists—it is called a set of scales. Scales 
have always been a symbol of justice. 
Naturally, if one is not content with a symbol but wants a tool 
for justice, an especially subtle set of scales is needed. Modern science 
has already provided it—a neural network.9 
In the case of the Roman testament I have consulted a neural 
network. I have entered into my computer, which runs a shell for 
such a network, the following four postulates: 
1. I f there is a mother and a son, and no daughter, the ratio for the 
property's division is to be 1:2. 
2. I f there is a mother and a daughter, and no son, the ratio for the 
property's division is to be 2:1. 
3. I f there is a daughter and a son, and no mother, the ratio for the 
property's division is to be 1:2. 
4. I f there is neither a son, nor a daughter, nor a mother, none of 
them receives anything. 
They represent partly the testator's expressed will (1 and 2), partly his 
presumed will (3), and partly what can be concluded logically from 
these (4). 
9 As for legal applications of neural networks see Philipps, Brass, & Emerich, A Neural 
Network to Identify Legal Precedents, 9TH SYMPOSIUM ON LEGAL DATA PROCESSING I N EU­
ROPE (Bonn, Oct. 10-12, 1989) (source on file with author); Philipps, Are Legal Decisions 
Based on the Application of Rules or Prototype Recognition? Legal Science on the Way to Neural 
Networks, in 2 PRE-PROCEEDINGS OF THE I I I INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LOGICA, 
INFORMATICA, DIRITTO LEGAL EXPERT SYSTEMS 673, (A. Martino ed., Florence 1989) 
(source on file with author); Philipps, Naheliegende Anwendungen Neuronaler Netze in der 
Rechtswissenschaft (Plausible Applications of Neural Networks in Legal Science), JUR PC, No­
vember-Dezember 1990, at 820 (source on file with author); Philipps, Τύ-Τύ 2. Von Recht­
sbegriffen und Neuronalen Neuen (Tü-Tu 2. On Legal Terms and Neural Networks), in 
RECHTSENTSTEHUNG UND RECHTSKULTUR (Kolloquium zu Ehren von Heinrich Scholler) 
(Philipps & Wittman eds., Heidelberg 1991) (source on file with author); Philipps, Analogie 
und Computer (Analogy and Computer), ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE, 
Beiheft 44, at 275 (1991) (source on file with author). 
Also, but more from the point of view of neuronal information retrieval, see Belew, A 
Connectionist Approach to Conceptual Information Retrieval, 1987 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND L A W 116 (source 
on file with author); Rose & Belew, Legal Infomation Retrieval' A Hybrid Approach, 1989 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLI-
GENCE AND L A W 138 (source on file with author); Fernhout, Using a Parallel Distributed 
Processing Model as Part of a Legal Expert System, in 1 PRE-PROCEEDINGS OF THE I I I INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LOGICA, INFORMATICA, DIRITTO LEGAL EXPERT SYSTEMS 255 
(A. Martino ed., Florence 1989) (source on file with author). 
HeinOnline - - 1 3 Cardozo L . Rev. 990 1991 - 1992 
1991] DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE 991 
Then the network was asked about the critical situation with 
three heirs.10 This was its solution: if there is a daughter, a mother, 
and a son, the ratio must be 2:3:4. Thus the daughter receives two-
ninths of the property, the mother three-ninths, and the son four-
ninths. 
This appears to be a decent compromise. Between daughter and 
son the ratio of 1:2 is retained, and the mother's portion lies in be-
tween, as was also the testator's wil l The only other plausible solu-
tion that I could think of is 1:2:3, where the ratio of 1:2 is retained 
between daughter and mother. Nevertheless, one-sixth of the inheri-
tance is still a bad deal for the daughter. 
I . 
What does this case of inheritance have to do with the division of 
damages in traffic accidents? A great deal, if one looks closely. First, 
the principle of the ratio is prevalent: nobody receives everything, but 
rather something is split among a few people according to a specific 
ratio. In accidents, however, it is not property, but the liability of 
paying for the damage that is divided. Second, there are certain pos-
tulates for the ratios, accepted by the courts. It is possible, however, 
that several different ratios may apply, and it is unclear how they are 
to be combined. Third, it is likely that a third party (or even a fourth 
and a fifth) has a part in the car accident and, as a result, the ratio 
between the first and the second differs from the ratio between the 
first and the third. The question now is how this should be figured 
into one ratio. 
Today, it is increasingly expected of the courts to divide assets 
and liabilities proportionally instead of an all-or-nothing award. The 
reasons may be many. One of them can be derived from the condi-
tions of traffic. These conditions are such that damage to another 
often follows from someone's inattentiveness. The same conditions 
make the victim's carelessness increase the risk for damage. In some 
cases the damaging and the damaged cannot be distinguished. Conse-
quently, everyone involved in the accident damages the other and suf-
fers damage himself. 
One participant's fault has to be combined with the other's con-
1 0 For the calculations, a fully interconnected back-propagation network with three input 
units, three output units, and two hidden units were used. The relation of 1:2 was expressed by 
output values of .33 and .66. The network very quickly learns the simple prototypes; possibly 
in only 80 cycles. The unfamiliar input of 1,1,1 (mother, son, and daughter exist) results in 
outputs of approximately .30, .45, and .60 (divided by 1.5 the result is .20, .30, and .40). Typi-
cally, the output of neural networks consists of approximations. 
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tributary fault. This calculation is not easy as fault does not have to 
be proportionate to the damage. The smallest mistake—amplified by 
technology—may cause enormous damage. Thus the relation be-
tween cause and effect is typically not linear. The law takes this into 
account by establishing strict liability—liability regardless of fault. 
How fault and strict liability are to be combined, however, remains 
unclear. 
Before everyone's eyes the distinction of the damaging and the 
damaged is lost, and everyone sees how easily he can be in one or the 
other position. Understandably, popular conviction can no longer 
distinguish between black and white, between all or nothing, with the 
nineteenth century's assurance. Differentiating judgment is called for. 
There may be other reasons along the same lines for this Zeitgeist; the 
reasons given are already plausible enough. The growing demand for 
differentiated ratios in court rulings has some powerful social reasons 
behind it. But so far little has been done in compliance with this de-
mand, outside of improvisation and guess-work. There are not even 
hints of a technique in jurisprudence for this problem that would be 
comparable to the technique of subsumption and interpretation which 
has been established over the course of centuries. 
In all "fair" and "adequate" decisions, we are doing something 
we do not really know how to do. We are doing it because it has to be 
done. Because of the increasing number of instances where such a 
decision is necessary, the inadequacy of our approach is increasingly 
felt. Nevertheless, the growing awareness of the problem has not 
resulted in an adequate solution. 
I I . 
Neural networks consist of several "neurons"—simple decisional 
units which are interconnected. The neurons affect one another. For 
example, activated units can communicate with their neighboring 
units and activate them in turn. Neurons may also restrain their 
neighbors, suppressing their activity. 
The neurons are activated by "impulses" from the outside world, 
which are received by the input units. The network reacts using out-
put units. Whether the reaction is correct may be determined by a 
comparison with learning patterns (at least this is the prevalent sys-
tem of back-propagation). Any deviation from the expected value is 
fed back into the network until the interconnected units' activity has 
reached a state of equilibrium. The network now has learned the cor-
rect relation of input and output, of impulse and reaction. 
Remarkably, the network also tolerates contradicting learning 
HeinOnline - 13 Cardozo L . Rev. 992 1991 - 1992 
1991] DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE 993 
patterns. The equilibrium attained by the units will be a compromise 
between the patterns. 
The same applies to patterns missing certain information; the 
network not only reacts to input with which it is already familiar, but 
it also finds a reaction to the new input patterns. While maintaining 
the equilibrium between the interdependent units, it attempts to har-
moniously adapt to the "precedent." 
In complex cases, learning cannot be handled by input and out-
put units alone; inner, "hidden" layers of units have to be incorpo-
rated. A model or an "internal representation" of the world is 
created. This internal representation will vary greatly according to 
the structure of the network. This variation will become apparent 
when the network has to react to unfamiliar input. Depending on the 
nature of the internal representation, the network's reactions differ. It 
will always react in a way similar to the "closest" familiar input pat-
tern according to how "similar" and "close" are defined by the net-
work's internal model. 
Neural networks are governed by principles which originate from 
biology. But the law also strives for a state of equilibrium. Conflict-
ing interests have to be settled, antagonistic principles have to be ob-
served equally. Gaps in the legal system have to be filled in a way 
consistent with existing precedent. Justice has always—from ancient 
times up to the present—been described in terms and models of equi-
librium and compromise. 
The attempt to utilize neural networks for legal cases, however, 
is not about philosophical speculation, but about something very 
down-to-earth—an instrument, capable of suggesting solutions for 
certain types of cases. The neural network is regarded as a machine 
which establishes internal equilibrium. Legal problems are trans-
posed onto this machine, and the machine's reaction is translated 
back to the case. 
These terms—neurons and equilibrium—have a provoking meta-
phorical ring to them. Nevertheless, I will show their meaning in 
concrete suggestions for decisions. Concrete decisions can be made a 
subject of argument; their quality can be tested. 
I I I . 
After a traffic accident the damage has to be divided fairly among 
the parties involved, and a ratio has to be determined. There are 
many precedents in German law, and judges have also developed cat-
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alogues suggesting ratios for common types of accidents.11 These cat* 
alogues can be very handy. On the other hand, they are criticized for 
being too rigid. My idea is to make use of a distribution catalogue 
that is more flexible by employing a neural network. The network 
would detect hidden inconsistencies in the catalogue, and it would 
also fill the gaps in the catalogue by interpolation. "Interpolation'9 is 
also one of Professor Zadeh's "key" words.12 
A network for damage distribution would not try to cover all 
conceiveable accidents. Rather, several networks would be used, one 
for each particular type of accident. With several types of accidents 
within one network, too many input units would be needed, and the 
units would not be properly interconnected. (Each unit should be 
given an interpretation in such a way that interconnections between 
units are meaningful—to the greatest possible extent.) 
The network I am going to demonstrate simulates the collision 
of two motorized vehicles driving in the same direction. The network 
has ten input units interpreted as follows: 
1 1 Cf Bursch & Jordan, typische Verkehrsunfälle und Schadensverteilung, VERKEHR-
SGERICHTSTAG I N GOSLAR (VGT) 231 (1983) (the "Hamburger Qotentabelle" (Hamburg Ta-
ble of Ratios)) (source on file with author); and its Munich counterpart, Krumbholz, Paul & 
Brüseken, Haftungsquoten bei Typischen Verkehrsunfeen, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERKEHR-
SRECHT (NZV) 168 (1988) (Munich Ratio Catalogue) (source on file with author); cf also the 
compilation of court rulings published by the ADAC (German Automobile Club): O.E. Hitzel, 
Schadensverteilung bei Verkehrsunfällen (1980) (source on file with author). 
1 2 L. Zadch, Fuzzy Logic: Principles, Applications, and Perspectives, Speech at sympo-
sium entitled "Decision and Inference in Litigation'* at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
(Mar. 24-26, 1991). 
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FIGURE 1 
995 
A turned into 
perking ipaoe or 
non-public road 
3 
A changed tartM ι 
2 
A loft parking 
•pace or norv 
public road 
4 
haavy city 
traffic 
β 
Β dnVing 
extremely fatt 
7 
A braking 
abruptly 
8 
A did not give tha 
proper signal 
10 
Β bumped into A Input units 
Ten input/output connections were entered as learning patterns, 
one pattern for each input unit. Each input combination stands for a 
legal case; the output values represent distribution ratios. According 
to German practice, the possible values are restricted to a nine level 
scale13 (some courts, however, prefer a different scale that uses simple 
fractions: 1:1; 1:2; . . . ; 1:5): 
1 3 The conversion formula for the ratios is: (b/a-1) if a J> b, and (1-a/b) if b > a. 
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-1.00 100:00 
-.75 80:20 
-.57 70:30 
-.33 60:40 
0.00 50:50 
.33 40:60 
.57 30:70 
.75 20:80 
1.00 00:100 
very large against the first party 
large against the first party 
medium against the first party 
small against the first party 
negligible; balance status 
small against the second party 
medium against the second party 
large against the second party 
very large against the second party 
As for the number of learning patterns, computer scientists may 
be getting an eerie feeling. Theory has it that there should be 
numerous learning patterns. With ten input units, there are as many 
as 1024 possible input combinations (2 to the power of 10), and each 
of them can be connected to different outputs. Can thousands of 
conceivable connections reasonably be guided by as few as ten 
learning patterns? 
In answering this question, two things should be considered. 
First, only a few of the input combinations which are logically 
possible can be interpreted as constellations which make sense from a 
legal point of view. Therefore, the user will look only for those few. 
Second, it is most important to choose learning patterns which are not 
only correct, but prototypical.14 For example, you can determine any 
cube by four points. But if the points are poorly selected, one 
hundred points may not be enough. 
The ten learning patterns include:15 
1 4 Philipps, Are Legal Decisions based on the Application of Rules or Prototype 
Recognition?, supra note 9. 
1 3 Adapted from the Munich Ratio Catalogue, supra note 11 (altered slightly to adopt 
them to the values of the nine level scale). 
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FIGURE 2 
Both wore using I 
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Both were using 
the same lane 
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non-pubNo road 
3 
Both were using 
the same lane 
Both \ 
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»re using I , . . . — \ I A braking | 
me lane [ — > U t ^ a h n \ - abruptly 1 
A left parking 
space or non-
pubio road 
4 
Both were ι 
the same I 
i using I heavy city I 
lane I — traffio L ~ 
1 I I · I 
A braking 
abruptly 
β 
Β driving 
extremely fast 
7 
Both were using I  A braking I 
Vmrn abruptly L in • Γ 
Both were using 
Both were using 
the same lane Y A left parking space or non-pubic road 3 A did not gk proper skj 10 
A stopping 
without apparent I 
reason 
9 
learning patterns 
•1: A pays everything 
•1: Β pays everything 
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Incidentally, if the patterns are viewed as a set of statements, 
they are contradictory. The first one states categorically, without any 
logical loophole for a possible exception, that if "[b]oth were using the 
same lane" the ratio shall be -1. However, if the second condition is 
added (that "A left parking space...") the ratio shall be + 1 . This is 
the way the law operates. The more specialized rule is "stronger" and 
forces out the more generalized one. The reason is that the more 
special association is stronger than the more general one; it is not a 
question of logic but of "psychology." 
Learning the patterns takes a 386-computer a few minutes. 
Afterwards new constellations can be entered, and the conclusions the 
network finds can be observed. Here is a sample of interpolated 
input/output combinations: 
FIGURE 3 
Both 
were 
using the 
same 
lane 
1 
A did not 
give the r 
signal 1 to • 
Both 
were 
A turned 
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parking 
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J . 
A 
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abruptly 
β 
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ming the 
tame 
lane 
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into 
parking 
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non­
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7 
road 
Both 
were 
using the 
A left 
parking 
spaoe or 
nor*, 
public 
road 
β driving 
extremely 
fast 
7 
4 
Both 
were 
sing the abruptly 
β 
A did not 
give the 
proper 
signal 
io 
Both 
were Ι Β driving I 
using the extremely] 
same fast 1 
lane 
1 
conclusions drawn by analogy 
At first glance, each of them looks reasonable. But for a test, one 
should change the rate by which the network learns and make it learn 
the patterns again. (A different learning rate means the system can 
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approach its target by small steps or by big steps. In the latter case, it 
will reach the target vicinity earlier but perhaps miss the target 
several times. It is like playing golf.) I f the network draws different 
conclusions from the same input at different learning rates, this may 
be a sign that the learning patterns are inconsistant. As for our 
example, most solutions seem to be stable. But not the connection 1, 
7, 4 = > .78. (Both were using the same lane; A, however, left a 
parking space; but Β was driving extremely fast.) At different 
learning rates, you get .87, .97, or .61 as an output. 
I have tried using different structures for the network, but its 
performance did not improve. Now I assume that the input units 4 
and 7 are too isolated in the network compared to the strain that is 
imposed by this connection; 4 has to totally reverse the normal result 
of 1 and is partially reversed by 7. These units will have to be backed 
by further learning patterns. 
I mentioned earlier that there are input combinations that make 
no sense from a legal point of view. However, it can be advantageous 
to enter semantically contradictory combinations in cases where a 
decision between input options is difficult. If, for example, a vehicle 
has changed lanes before the collision took place at a distance from 
the following car which could perhaps be regarded as safe, it is 
difficult to decide whether it is a one lane or a two lane accident (our 
last examples of "conclusions drawn by analogy")* In such cases, the 
German courts use an average, in this case a ratio of 0 (50:50). So 
does our network. 
IV. 
One of the neural network's most important assets is the possibil­
ity of entering precedent rulings as learning patterns. The trends in 
court rulings are integrated directly into the network, even if they 
modify earlier precedents. In theory, of course, a mathematical 
formula which could do the same always exists. And yet, how is the 
formula to be discovered, and how is it to be kept up to date with the 
trends in the courts? It would certainly be more than mathematicians 
could do, not to mention jurists. But even if a formula solving all the 
common cases could be found, what guarantee can there be that the 
distant consequences, which cannot be foreseen, will not be unjust? A 
neural network does indeed guarantee it. The neurons strive for equi­
librium, and when the conditions of the equilibrium are translated 
into the terms of the case, the resulting solution cannot be totally 
unjust. 
The neurons in a network act like a group of people in a very 
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crowded room—they are resting side by side, and they have accom-
modated to their neighbors. From time to time, however, one of them 
changes his position. Then his neighbors have to move, and the 
neighbors' neighbors as well, until, after a few shoves, everyone has 
found a new comfortable position. His immediate neighbors will be 
affected first, but through the movement of the neighbors, and of their 
neighbors in turn, the need to stir might extend even to a remote cor-
ner. Some, of course, will not budge; they are comparable to the fixed 
learning patterns. 
This is not to say that the people in the room have indeed at-
tained the ideal degree of comfort. A better solution may well have 
been possible. But who is to calculate the perfect position given eve-
ryone's different sizes and positions? And, most importantly, before 
you have finished calculating, someone will have moved again. 
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